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s DUCATION REFORM IS an important issue not only for stu-
dents, parents and educators, but also for the businesses that
will one day employ today’s students. With this in mind, the
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas hosted a public policy con-
ference, “The Business of Education: Meeting the Demands of
a Strong Economy Through Educational Change,” on October
17, 1997. The conference brought together educators, policymakers,
academics and members of the business community to discuss the
current condition of the educational system, the goals and standards
of education, popular educational reform issues and business’ stake
in the outcome.
As conference participants made clear, the current condition of edu-
cation in Texas raises serious concerns about the quality of tomor-
row’s workforce. Tom Luce noted that on national standardized tests
only 26 percent of Texas fourth-graders are ranked proficient in read-
ing and less than 20 percent are ranked proficient in mathematics.
Thirty percent of high school graduates who enter Texas colleges






Exchange Rates: Fixed, Pegged, 
or Flex? Should We Care?courses. It is not particularly reassuring
to note that despite these weaknesses,
Texas ranks in the middle of the pack
nationally on standardized tests.
Building on a broad consensus about
the need for educational reform, confer-
ence participants addressed three ques-
tions at the heart of the education debate:
Who should decide how students will
be educated? What’s the best road to re-
form? How should we fund education?
Who Should Decide
How Students Will Be Educated?
Students and their families have an
obvious role in educational decision-
making. The current debate rests on 
the issue of whether any other party—
namely, government—should also be
involved in the decision.
Conference panelist Lori Taylor 
offered three economic rationales for
government participation in the educa-
tional decisions of parents and children.
First, education may generate benefits
to society that exceed those to the stu-
dents themselves. For example, from
the student’s perspective, the primary
benefit of additional education is an 
increase in take-home pay. However,
from society’s perspective, the benefits
also include any increased taxes that
the students will pay as a result of their
additional education. Furthermore, all
other things being equal, communities
with lots of educated residents grow
faster than other communities and are
more likely to attract new firms. No stu-
dent thinks about the impact additional
schooling might have on the commu-
nity’s economic growth or its attractive-
ness to business. Because students and
their families don’t consider all the 
benefits when they make an educa-
tional decision—like whether to go on
to college or to drop out of high
school—they might tend to invest less
in education than is optimal from soci-
ety’s point of view. Thus, society has an
interest in encouraging people to invest
in more education than they would pri-
vately choose to do.
The high cost of education provides
a second economic rationale for gov-
ernment participation in the decision.
The full cost of providing a child with 
a high school education can exceed the
sticker price of a top-of-the-line Lexus.
However, without government assis-
tance, it would be much harder to get a
loan to pay for that high school educa-
tion than it is to get a car loan. The lack
of collateral would lead lenders to
charge an especially high rate of inter-
est for an education loan—if you could
even find someone who would lend
money to an inner-city kid with no
credit history. Thus, government has a
role in making the education credit
market work—either by helping fi-
nance an education directly or by sub-
sidizing private loans for education.
However, there is a catch: just as the
private lender has every right to make
sure that the money from a car loan is
used to actually buy a car, the govern-
ment has every right to ensure that a
student uses an education loan to buy
schooling.
The third possible rationale for gov-
ernment participation in education lies
in charity. If society feels charitable to-
ward children (or toward their parents),
then financing of education is a tool 
for redistributing some of society’s re-
sources in their direction. Although stu-
dents and their families might prefer
cash, they receive schooling because
society is paternalistic. A similar argument
explains why poor people are given
food stamps rather than cash; society
wants the recipients to consume what it
thinks is good for them, not necessarily
what they think is good for them.
Taylor argued that acceptance of any
of these rationales implies that govern-
ment has a legitimate role in educa-
tional decision-making. However, it is
not obvious which level of govern-
ment—federal, state or local—should
fill government’s role in education. For
example, panelist Lynne Cheney argued
that national educational standards
“may be a good idea in the abstract
[but] you don’t get the common-sense
input of informed citizens when you
develop these things at that high, ether-
eal level.” Cheney, who favors less cen-
tralized decision-making, claimed that
“many states have gone through rigor-
ous debates about what standards
should be…and the results are pretty
good.”
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Public SchoolsWhat’s the Best Road to Reform?
Conference panelists discussed a 
variety of reforms to the current educa-
tional system. Some panelists stressed
the benefits of fostering market-based
competition to traditional public schools,
while others stressed the benefits of re-
forming the public school system from
within. A recurring theme among the
conference participants, regardless of
their perspective on reform strategy,
was the need for a mechanism to meas-
ure school successes (and failures).
Market-Based Solutions. Myron
Lieberman argued that a competitive
market system is better than govern-
ment operation of the school system. 
In his opinion, the problem is that
“public schools are not part of a system
where improvement is mandatory to
survive.” He favors privatizing the pub-
lic school system altogether.
Caroline Hoxby discussed some of
her research on the positive effects of
enhancing school competition through
vouchers.
1 She finds that, first, “public
schools really can and do respond 
to competition…by really improving
student performance.” Second, the re-
sponse of public schools to the voucher
programs depends on the fiscal incen-
tives: if the money does not follow the
student, then voucher programs have
little impact on performance in public
schools. Third, she finds that with
voucher programs, “parents are much
more involved, not just in the voucher
schools and the private schools, but
even in the public schools…because
parents are making more active
choices.”
Solutions From Within the Sys-
tem. While voucher programs are in-
tended to improve public school
performance through increased compe-
tition with private schools, charter
schools enhance competition within the
public school system. Charter schools
offer groups the opportunity to create
and operate a public school under a
contract with the local school board or
other public entity. These schools are
freed from some state rules and regula-
tions in exchange for a commitment to
achieve certain outcomes.
Arizona is considered one of the
leading states in the charter-school
movement, with more than 250 charter
schools—about 10 percent of the U.S.
total. Gary Huggins discussed the state’s
program, which he said has the most
liberal and open charter school law in
the country. Huggins pointed out that
charter schools, like vouchers, are
putting pressure on traditional public
schools to find innovative ways to 
attract students.
As traditional public schools respond
to competitive pressure from programs
such as vouchers and charter schools,
they are also called upon to reform
from within through increased account-
ability. Accountability reform implies
that there are consequences for schools
and teachers, both good and bad, 
depending on student performance.
Sandy Kress summed up the need for
accountability in public schools when
he said, “People feel the need to re-
spond when they are measured; people
respond when there are consequences
for the measurement.”
Measurement. Many conference
participants stressed the need for good
information about the performance 
of students and schools. Kress noted, 
“If we don’t know where each child is
in terms of their attainment…then we’re
totally flying blind.” Pascal Forgione
emphasized the need for a national or
international standard for measuring
performance, because otherwise, “once
you start making progress…no one’s
going to believe you.” Lieberman ar-
gued that, to be credible, tests of stu-
dent performance need to come from
outside the educational establishment.
Conference participants suggested
that one of the most important roles for
business in educational reform was in
the area of measurement. Accounta-
bility is integral to the profitability of
firms, and panelists agreed that busi-
ness could bring its expertise in meas-
uring success to the educational system.
As Jim Adams put it, “We in business
look at all things from a measurement
perspective.”
How Should We Fund Education?
The conference participants agreed
that school finance is a large and grow-
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school successes 
(and failures).ing problem for Texas. Robert Lane re-
minded the audience that Texas’ state
and local governments spend about 
$19 billion annually on public schools,
and $11 billion of those funds come
from taxes on business. Jill Shugart
added, “The statewide student popula-
tion of Texas is growing at the rate 
of 70,000 to 80,000 children per year.
That fact alone requires the infusion 
of $1.4 billion in new revenue each 
biennium just to maintain the same 
dollars per child.”
Equity and local control of school 
finance were important issues for all
three members of the school finance
panel. Lane discussed the problems 
created by wide differences in taxable
wealth across school districts. Shugart
attributed Texas’ equity problems to
overreliance on the property tax. “Equity,”
she stated, “is based on the notion that
children who hail from the property-
poorest school districts in the state are
nonetheless entitled to an adequate 
education.” She expressed concern
about local ability to finance the un-
equal facilities needs of Texas school
districts. “Equity is not going to be
achieved unless the facilities issue is
factored in,” she said. Taylor argued
that because “the Dallas worker of to-
morrow may be in Houston or Plano
schools today…it may be appropriate to
shift more of the [school tax] burden to
the state level.” However, she also em-
phasized, “Parents must retain choice
about the level of education spending.”
The structure of the school finance
system also received a great deal of 
attention. Both Lane and Taylor stressed
the need for a school finance system
that does not favor one type of business
over another. In particular, Lane argued
against overreliance on business prop-
erty taxes (which fall disproportionately
on capital-intensive firms) and cor-
porate franchise taxes (which fall dis-
proportionately on corporations).
Finally, Taylor pointed out that the
primary beneficiaries—students and
their families—bear much of the cost of
education under the current system. “At
the high school level nationally, 55 per-
cent of our school resources come from
the students themselves in terms of the
value of their time,” she noted. Parents
also pay school property taxes and pick
up much of the burden of taxes that
originate at the business level. “No mat-
ter how much the legislature would like
to argue that a tax that is nominally 
assigned to business is going to be
borne by business,” she said, “much of
it actually passes through to the em-
ployees and the customers of the firm.”
Conclusions
The conference focused on the prob-
lems with public education in the
United States. However, the picture is
not all bleak, particularly in Texas.
There are definite signs of improve-
ment. Only two other states made more
progress than Texas between 1990 and
1996 on the National Assessment of 
Educational Progress test in eighth
grade mathematics.
Because schools transform today’s
students into tomorrow’s skilled work-
ers, continued progress is vital to en-
sure the future economic growth of our
region. The skilled-labor pool has been
cited as one of the most important fac-
tors, if not the most important factor, in
a firm’s decision to operate in Texas.
2 In
the words of Tom Luce, “Business really
must go, and will go today, to where
the skilled workers are.…The funda-
mental challenge facing our state is that
we’re going to run out of skilled work-




1 The details of school voucher programs vary, but essentially students
are given a tuition subsidy for the private school of their choice, with
for-profit and denominational schools often excluded.
2 For a further discussion, see the article, “Silicon Prairie,” in the
May/June 1997 issue of Southwest Economy.







progress is vital to
ensure the future
economic growth of
our region.ECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
the stock market have attracted
intense interest from individual
investors and policymakers
alike. The meteoric ascent of
stock prices over the past two
years has generated concern about
whether prices are justified by the so-
called fundamentals or whether they
represent a speculative bubble. This
concern grew considerably on October
27 when the Dow Jones industrial aver-
age fell 7 percent—the 12th largest
one-day decline on record. Although
the market has since stabilized, investor
and policymaker concern apparently
has not. Investors worry that if prices
are a bubble and it bursts, their recent
gains will evaporate. Policymakers worry
about the market’s effect on the econ-
omy and how to respond if any correc-
tion becomes a full-fledged bear market.
This article steps back from the mar-
ket’s recent day-to-day gyrations and
puts the current bull market in historical
and cross-country perspective. It also ana-
lyzes the major long-term determinants
of stock prices and how well those fun-
damentals explain current market prices.
The Bull Market in Perspective
The news media and analysts often
talk about the upward movement in
stock prices over the past two years as
if it were unprecedented. Viewed on a
simple numeric scale, as in Chart 1, this
rise in Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index
does look unprecedented. On this scale,
a 5 percent rise in the index looks a lot
bigger today than it did in, say, 1950,
because a 5 percent rise today means a
rise of almost 50 points, whereas a 5
percent rise in 1950 meant a rise of only
1 point. A more meaningful way to look
at stock prices over the long term is on
a logarithmic scale, on which a 5 per-
cent rise in 1950 looks the same as a 5
percent rise today (Chart 2).
Viewed on a log scale, and after 
adjusting stock prices for inflation, the
recent bull market does not look un-
usual at all. Chart 2 also shows that the
last few years’ increases are just a small
part of a longer bull market that goes
back to 1981, if one is willing to incor-
porate a number of temporary setbacks
along the way. We can compare this
longer term bull market with previous
ones: for example, the one from 1950 to
1968 and the one from 1922 to 1929. In
addition, there was an important bull
market before the period shown on this
chart, during roughly 1880–1910.
Table 1 summarizes some of the more
salient characteristics of these four bull
markets. Again, the central message is
that the current bull market does not
stand out from those that preceded it, in
terms of either length or total return. 
Indeed, the current market ranks be-
hind the other three in terms of real 
annual average return. The table also
shows that these bull markets have 
occurred in different profit growth and
real interest rate environments. For ex-
ample, both profit growth and real in-
terest rates were lower during the
1950–68 bull market than they have
been in the current one.
Nor does the current U.S. bull market
stand out in comparison with those in
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  5
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October. This is one of the peculiarly dan-
gerous months to speculate in stocks in.
The others are July, January, September,
April, November, May, March, June, De-
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1990 1980 1970 1960 1950 1940 1930 1920 1910
Table 1
Bull Markets in U.S. History
1880–1910 1922–29 1950–68 1981–97
Length (years) 30.0 7.75 19.0 15.75
Real return* 14.2 19.9 14.0 13.9
Real GDP growth* 4.0 6.0 4.2 2.8
Real profit growth* N.A. 6.0 4.9 5.8
Real interest rates 3.7 4.5 1.6 5.6
* Average annual growth rates.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board.
Chart 2
…But Look Less Unusual 








1990 1980 1970 1960 1950 1940 1930 1920 1910other countries. Table 2 shows that over
the life of the current U.S. bull market,
real price appreciation in the U.K. and
German stock markets has come close
to or exceeded our own. The major 
exception is the Japanese stock market,
which suffered a severe asset price bub-
ble that burst in 1990 and from which
the economy has yet to recover. But 
at least compared with the U.K. and
Germany, the United States does not
appear unique.
All bull markets, of course, end at
some point. Frequently, as with the
1880–1910 and 1950–68 markets, they
end as a result of external shocks—war
in the first case, stagflation in the sec-
ond. In 1929, however, the market col-
lapsed because it had overreached
itself, and speculative excess led to
stock prices unjustified by the funda-
mentals. The question is, Where are
prices relative to fundamentals today?
A Fundamentals-Based Model
A traditional discounted earnings
model can be used to determine the 
extent to which the fundamentals justify
the level of stock prices. This model 
assumes that investors value a firm’s
stock only as much as they value 
the firm’s present and future earnings.
The value of the discounted expected
earnings stream, which should equal
the current price of the stock, has 
two components. The first is the fore-
casted future earnings stream itself. 
The second is the interest rate used 
to discount forecasted earnings streams.
This discount rate is the default-free 
real rate of interest—represented by 
the long-term government bond rate—
plus an equity risk premium, which is
the extra return investors require for
holding risky stocks.
This model can be used to determine
a “fundamental” price for the S&P 500,
using three factors: forecasted earnings,
the real interest rate on Treasury bonds
and the equity risk premium. As a
measure of future earnings streams for
each company in the S&P 500, I use the
consensus forecast for long-term profit
growth (three to five years out) of
I/B/E/S International Inc. For the dis-
count rate I use the real 10-year bond
yield as the riskless rate of interest, plus
an estimated constant risk premium on
equity. I use the model to calculate a
predicted S&P 500 price for the period
1984–97.
Chart 3 plots this predicted price on
a log scale against the actual S&P 500
price. As of October 31, the discrepancy
between the two was about 3 percent.
Given the imprecision inherent in all
stock market models, this difference
does not appear large enough to sup-
port claims of substantial overvaluation.
Additionally, over most of the period
the predicted price tracks the actual
price quite closely, except for two peri-
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Table 2
U.S. and Foreign Stock Markets, 1981–97
U.S. Germany U.K. Japan
Real market index* 9.9 11.7 7.3 4.0
Real GDP growth* 2.8 2.9 2.5 2.2
Real profit growth* 5.8 4.0 5.0 2.7
Real interest rates 5.6 5.2 5.9 4.2
*Average annual growth rates.
SOURCES: Federal Reserve Board; Bank of England; Bank of Japan; Deutsche Bundesbank.
Chart 3
Predicted Versus Actual 
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The current bull
market does not
stand out from those
that preceded it…nor
does [it] stand out
in comparison with
those in other
countries.ods when the actual price was sub-
stantially above that predicted by fun-
damentals. The first was in mid-1987,
when the actual price was about 30 per-
cent above the predicted price, provid-
ing evidence that market prices were
unjustified by profit forecasts and there-
fore constituted a bubble. The market
itself came to believe that, and correc-
tions in October 1987 brought 
actual prices down to the level pre-
dicted by the model.
The second period was 1991–92,
when the economy was in its recession
trough and actual prices were about 
25 percent above those predicted by
fundamentals. In this case, it was the
analysts who were wrong about the
strength of the recovery, not the market,
and their profit forecasts were revised
up sharply in 1993. As a result, pre-
dicted prices rose to the level of actual
prices in 1993.
The main message from the model is
that unlike 1987, current market prices
are not built on air but appear to be
based on actual current discount rates
and profit expectations. The question
this analysis begs, of course, is how 
realistic these profit expectations are.
Stock market bulls and bears have dif-
ferent answers.
Bulls point to the recent strong profit
growth of U.S. companies as evidence
of the “new paradigm” economy, in which
technological innovation and globali-
zation of product and labor markets
present vast opportunities to improve
efficiency, increase productivity, lower
production costs and ultimately gen-
erate stronger profits. These trends are
aided by improved economic policy-
making by the Federal Reserve and the
government, which has resulted in
lower federal budget deficits and lower
inflation.
Bulls argue that these forces will con-
tinue to improve productivity and prof-
its, and point to a number of striking
trends. First, improvements in the pro-
duction of computer power over the
past 15 years have been immense. Sec-
ond, the opening of the formerly closed
economies of China, Russia and India
will ultimately introduce more than 1
billion low-cost laborers and almost as
many potential middle-class consumers
onto world markets. These develop-
ments, bulls contend, cannot fail to
vastly increase profit opportunities for
companies worldwide.
Bears view these changes as evolu-
tionary, not revolutionary. They see the
recent strong profit growth as the result
of other, temporary factors that may
soon run their course. Thus, they are
much less confident about future profit
growth now that we are in the mature
stage of a business cycle.
Are Analysts’
Profit Expectations Realistic?
In evaluating the bulls’ and bears’ 
arguments, it’s important to note that
company analysts’ current expectations
for profit growth over the next three to
five years are bullish. Analysts expect
S&P 500 companies to average earnings
per share (EPS) growth of almost 13
percent annually for the next three to
five years. How realistic are these ex-
pectations? Table 3 compares analysts’
long-term EPS forecast with EPS growth
during 1981–97 and 1991–97, and with
a separate forecast by DRI/McGraw-Hill
Inc., a macroeconomic forecaster. While
profits have surged by more than 17
percent annually since 1991, over the
entire bull market their growth has
been much more subdued. One reason,
of course, is that 1991–97 represents the
recovery from a recession trough—
profit growth should be faster during
this period than over the entire business
cycle. Company analysts are currently
forecasting future profit growth closer
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  7
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SOURCES: I/B/E/S International Inc.; DRI/McGraw-
Hill Inc.
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expectations are.to this rate than to the pace since 1981.
It’s also informative to compare the
analysts’ forecasts with that of DRI/
McGraw-Hill. The difference illustrates
that “bottom-up” forecasts of S&P 500
profit growth, which build up from in-
dividual company forecasts, are almost
always more optimistic than “top-
down” forecasts, which are derived
from forecasts of GDP growth and other
macroeconomic aggregates. At first
glance, neither method seems inher-
ently superior. Bottom-up forecasts,
such as those from I/B/E/S, might bene-
fit from specific company knowledge
that macroeconomic forecasters, such
as DRI, do not have. On the other hand,
bottom-up forecasters might assume
that the individual company they are
analyzing will make the next technolog-
ical or market breakthrough. If only one
company in the industry will benefit
from the next breakthrough, but each
analyst assumes that the company he or
she researches will be the one to do 
so, then their aggregated forecasts will
inflate aggregate profit growth. Thus,
bottom-up forecasts might be subject to
errors that make them too optimistic.
Table 4 presents evidence on the 
accuracy of analysts’ previous long-term
forecasts for EPS growth. It compares
forecasts of three to five years of S&P
500 EPS growth with the S&P 500’s 
actual EPS growth over the subsequent
four years. Table 4 suggests that ana-
lysts’ forecasts have generally been too
optimistic, except for the period 1992–
96, when they were substantially too
pessimistic. This could result from ana-
lysts not foreseeing the recovery in
1992, or it could (as bulls might argue)
be the result of their being surprised by
the profit growth arising from tech-
nological innovations. Overall, how-
ever, analysts’ forecasting record is
decidedly mixed, with some tendency
toward overoptimism.
In addition, bears are concerned that
the strong profit growth over the past
few years is due primarily to temporary
or special factors, some of which have
largely run their course. For example, 
financial-sector profit growth has been
very strong, but this, bears argue, pri-
marily results from restructuring activity
by banks and other financial institutions
that cannot continue indefinitely.
Chart 4 shows nonfinancial firms’
total profits and net interest payments
as a share of nonfinancial-sector GDP.
Note that the increase in the interest
share in the early 1980s—a decade of
high corporate debt and high interest
rates—coincides with a fall in profit
share. And the marked fall in the inter-
est share in the 1990s coincides with the
recovery of the profit share. Bears claim
that the future boost to profits from this
source may be limited, since both de-
leveraging activity and declining market
interest rates appear to have ended.
Bulls respond that it is a mistake to
look at aggregate profits for the econ-
omy as a whole, since investors are
pricing S&P 500 companies’ earnings,
not the earnings of the entire economy.
S&P 500 companies are the ones most
affected by the new-era forces of tech-
nological innovation and global trade.
As shown in Table 5, the S&P 500 has a
much greater weight of companies in
innovative, high-tech, high-profit growth
sectors than the economy as a whole.
For example, technology-sector firms
constitute more than 15 percent of 
the S&P 500 but only 3 percent of the
aggregate economy, and they have ex-
perienced annual EPS growth of more
than 40 percent since 1992.
The Bottom Line
What’s the bottom line on the stock
market? A simple model of stock price
valuation suggests that if the market is
overvalued relative to current discount
rates and profit expectations, it is not
overvalued by much. Thus, the current
situation differs from that of 1987, when
prices rose about 30 percent above
those justified by profit forecasts and
discount rates. However, the profit fore-
casts on which the model is based do
look very bullish for this stage of the
business cycle, and there is good reason
to suspect that these expectations may
go unrealized. If that happens, then stock
prices would ultimately have to decline.
The wild card is when the new-era
forces, which include a monetary policy
environment that prevents rising infla-
tion, will begin ratcheting up productiv-
ity and profits. Probably the only sure
thing about the stock market debate is
that the argument between the bulls
and bears will continue to rage.
—Stephen D. Prowse
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Chart 4
Profit and Interest Share of
Nonfinancial Firms as a































SOURCES: I/B/E/S International Inc.; DRI/McGraw-
Hill Inc.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board.
Table 5
Profit Growth by Sector
Percent of Percent of Annual EPS
Sector S&P 500* economy* growth**
Technology 15.7 3.0 41.7
Financials 15.9 6.5 21.6
*In 1997. **Average 1992–97.
SOURCES: Federal Reserve Board; Wall Street Journal, Sept. 22, 1997, p. A1.T HAS BEEN ALMOST three years
since the devaluation of the Mexi-
can peso in December 1994. At
that time, the doomsayers pre-
dicted the end of the world for
Mexico. And how is Mexico’s
economy doing these days? Alive and
well, thank you. In fact, it’s booming—
just like the economy of Argentina, 
another country doomsayers had pre-
dicted would have collapsed by now.
As noted in an earlier issue of Southwest
Economy (November/December 1996),
Argentina was the Latin American coun-
try that suffered the greatest contagion
effect from the Mexican crisis.
The doomsayers were followed by
the usual “Monday morning quarter-
backs,” to quote the expression that
Dallas Fed President Robert D. McTeer,
Jr. uses to describe the amazing amount
of ex post facto wisdom elicited by the
Mexican devaluation of the peso. After
the crisis, self-appointed experts made
all kinds of recommendations about the
exchange rate policies that would take
both countries out of the woods for-
ever. Not surprisingly, proponents of
flexible exchange rates argued that
Mexico would have never gotten into
the crisis in the first place if it had had
a flexible exchange rate instead of the
pegged one implemented five years
prior to the crisis. By the same token,
they argued that Argentina would have
suffered a milder form of “tequila 
effect”—or escaped it altogether—if it
had had a flexible exchange rate in-
stead of the rigid currency-board mech-
anism adopted in 1991. According to
these views, flexible exchange rates
were the only way out of the slump 
for Mexico and Argentina. Thus, they
blessed Mexico’s decision to move to 
a flexible exchange rate regime and
predicted that Argentina, which decided
to keep its currency-board system, was
doomed to failure.
This prediction, however, did not
materialize, as is apparent in Chart 1.
The chart plots quarterly rates of GDP
growth for Mexico and Argentina right
after the devaluation of the Mexican
peso in December 1994. Keeping in
mind that the effects of the devaluation
reached Argentina about one quarter
later than Mexico, we compare Mexico’s
GDP growth in any given quarter after
the devaluation with Argentina’s GDP
growth in the subsequent quarter. Align-
ment of growth rates in this way reveals
a striking similarity in the recession–
recovery pattern of both countries. In
the analysis that follows, we take the
view that the recent economic experi-
ences of Argentina and Mexico are very
close to the controlled laboratory ex-
periments that economists crave, and
envy in other sciences.
The two countries are alike in many
dimensions, but responded with almost
opposite policies to basically the same
speculative attack against their curren-
cies. Mexico devalued; Argentina did
not. Mexico bailed out its financial 
system; Argentina did not (in fact, it let
25 percent of its banks go belly up).
Mexico engaged in “sterilization” poli-
cies during the crisis; that is, it tried to
keep the money supply from falling as
the capital outflows tended to dry up
liquidity. Argentina, instead, let the
money supply contract an astonishing
20 percent in three months, the same
percentage by which the money supply
contracted during the Great Depression
in the United States over three years.
Yet, despite the almost opposite mone-
tary policies pursued by the two coun-
tries, they faced the same fate: a similar
recession followed the speculative attack
against their currencies (Chart 1).
The differences in economic policies
and the commonality of outcomes do not
stop there, however. As mentioned above,
Mexico stopped following a pegged
exchange rate after the crisis and in-
stead adopted a flexible exchange rate.
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Chart 1
Recession–Recovery Patterns in Argentina and 
Mexico after Peso Devaluation



















Year-end quarter after devaluation
NOTE: First observation for Argentina corresponds to second quarter of 1995, for Mexico to the first quarter of 1995.Argentina, by contrast, continued imple-
menting a fixed exchange rate policy in
its most extreme form: a currency-board
system. Yet, despite these different poli-
cies, the chart shows that both countries
have recovered at about the same brisk
pace. And there are no signs that the re-
covery will fizzle out any time soon in
either country; in fact, markets seem to
be bullish about both of them.
What can we conclude from all this?
Perhaps that there is very little that ex-
change rate regimes (whether flexible,
fixed, or pegged) can do to prevent
economic crises and recessions, and,
conversely, that there is little exchange
rate management can do to boost eco-
nomic activity. In fact, while our “con-
trolled experiment” interpretation of 
the data in Chart 1 is admittedly rather
casual, it is not without some support
from well-established economic theory.
A number of respected scholars, includ-
ing Helpman (1981) and Auernheimer
(1987), have argued that the choice of
exchange rate regime is not all that 
important for the growth performance
of the economy. According to these 
theories, what matters most is “real” fac-
tors, not “nominal” ones. Low inflation,
fiscal policies such as liberalization of
trade and financial intermediation, and
free-market reforms are much more 
important determinants of growth and
economic fluctuations than is the par-
ticular monetary instrument used by 
the central bank to achieve (or destroy)
price stability.
To see this from the perspective of 
a policymaker confused as to what to
do, consider once more the view that
Argentina would have escaped the re-
cession if it had provided more liquidity
to banks in the course of the specula-
tive attack. Mexico did exactly that, yet
its recession was as intense as Argen-
tina’s. Likewise, consider the advice,
heard equally often, that Mexico’s road
to recovery would be smoother and faster
if it were to adopt a currency-board 
system like Argentina’s. Mexico, with its
flexible exchange rate, is growing at
about the same pace as Argentina with
its fixed exchange rate. Meanwhile,
doomsayers in the flexible exchange
rate camp believed that Argentina could
not possibly recover from the recession
unless it adopted a flexible exchange
rate regime. Yet, Argentina is growing
almost as fast, if not faster, than flexible
exchange rate Mexico. In each case, the
dynamics of output, as predicted by
theory, seems to have been invariant to
the choice of exchange rate regime.
On these grounds, the recent experi-
ences of Argentina and Mexico (and of
Southeast Asian countries, for readers
familiar with the crisis triggered by the
devaluation of the Thai baht beginning
July 2 of this year) suggest to policy-
makers that speculative attacks, with or
without devaluations, will come and go
and that exchange rate management
may do little about them. Policymakers
might be better off, therefore, concen-
trating their energies in controlling
“real” factors rather than in experiment-
ing with different varieties of monetary
voodoo. Doing the right things about
real factors—sound fiscal policies, low
inflation, free-market reforms, free trade,
free and strong financial systems—will,
in the end, be the only effective way to
put speculators in retreat. That is what
Chile did many years ago, and it paid
off. This is what Mexico and Argentina
started to do not long ago and have
kept doing despite the recent crisis.
There is no reason to think that their 
efforts will not pay off as handsomely
as the same approach did in Chile.
—Carlos E. J. M. Zarazaga
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s sFurther Information 
on the Data
For more information on employment
data, see “Reassessing Texas Employment
Growth” (Southwest Economy, July/August
1993). For TIPI, see “The Texas Industrial 
Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic 
Review, November 1989). For the Texas
Leading Index and its components, see 
“The Texas Index of Leading Indicators: 
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas
Fed  Economic Review, July 1990).
Online economic data and articles are
available on the Dallas Fed’s Internet Web
site, www.dallasfed.org.
Thousands of persons Index, 1987 = 100 July–September 1997
Total Nonfarm Employment
Index, January 1994 = 100
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EXAS LED THE Eleventh District in employment
growth over the past 12 months, adding wage and
salary jobs at a 4.5 percent annual rate, about double
the U.S. growth rate over the same period. Texas’
growth was broad based. In-migration of firms and job
seekers, as well as expansions of existing firms, fed
construction employment. Profitable energy prices boosted
employment in the oil and gas extraction industries. Contin-
ued growth in trucking and warehousing contributed to job
growth of the transportation industries. Improvements in the
Mexican economy added manufacturing and trade jobs.
Employment growth in the Eleventh District increased in
the third quarter, after slightly slower growth in the second
quarter. Texas led the District states with an annualized
growth rate of 3.5 percent in the third quarter, followed by
Louisiana at 1.2 percent and New Mexico at less than 1 percent.
T
Regional Economic Indicators
Texas employment* Total nonfarm employment*
Texas Private
Leading TIPI Construc- Manufac- Govern- service- New
Index total Mining tion turing ment producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
9/97 124.2 127.6 165.6 467.7 1,083.8 1,476.6 5,462.3 8,656.0 1,834.2 706.5
8/97 122.4 127.3 165.4 465.9 1,082.4 1,473.7 5,438.7 8,626.1 1,828.3 707.4
7/97 122.3 127.3 165.7 463.9 1,078.7 1,468.2 5,426.2 8,602.7 1,830.7 707.8
6/97 121.0 127.0 164.7 464.9 1,078.2 1,467.8 5,407.0 8,582.6 1,828.9 705.8
5/97 121.4 125.5 163.8 463.2 1,077.6 1,471.6 5,401.2 8,577.4 1,827.0 705.4
4/97 120.2 124.7 163.6 458.1 1,076.4 1,470.0 5,384.8 8,552.9 1,828.5 703.4
3/97 119.1 124.6 163.0 455.1 1,073.5 1,468.8 5,371.4 8,531.8 1,824.1 702.1
2/97 119.4 124.1 162.6 455.8 1,070.1 1,467.2 5,344.6 8,500.3 1,821.9 701.6
1/97 118.9 124.3 161.5 446.9 1,067.4 1,466.7 5,317.5 8,460.0 1,820.3 699.8
12/96 117.7 124.0 159.3 444.2 1,066.1 1,464.8 5,279.5 8,413.9 1,819.4 698.5
11/96 118.7 123.8 158.8 445.7 1,065.4 1,460.3 5,270.9 8,401.1 1,818.7 697.0
10/96 117.6 123.3 157.9 442.6 1,061.7 1,456.3 5,239.4 8,357.9 1,816.0 696.2
* in thousands
The Texas Leading Index rose strongly in September on the
heels of July and August increases, signaling more of the
same. However, there continue to be signs of strain from labor
market tightness. Personnel supply services employment rose
at a 21 percent annual rate in September, as employers con-
tinue to report difficulty hiring and retaining qualified work-
ers. The Texas seasonally adjusted unemployment rate fell to
5.3 percent in September, tying December 1996 as the lowest
unemployment rate since 1981. Excluding the border area,
Texas unemployment is 4.7 percent, slightly lower than the
U.S. rate in September. Some business contacts report accel-
erated growth of service sector salaries and inability to meet
demand due to insufficient labor resources. However, wide-
spread price increases have not yet occurred as a result of
these pressures.
—Sheila Dolmas
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Fourth Quarter Economic Headlines
Economists present research into three diverse issues in the 
Dallas Fed’s fourth quarter Economic Review. Economic Review
is a quarterly journal that takes a policy-oriented approach to
thought-provoking economic issues. Free subscriptions and indi-
vidual copies are available on request by calling 1-800-333-4460
or 1-214-922-5254, or by faxing 214-922-5268.
Has Long-Run Profitability Risen in the 1990s? by John V. Duca
An analysis of the recent rebound in nonfinancial corporate profit-
ability, as measured by after-tax profits as a share of output.
Intellectual Property Rights and Product Effectiveness by Stephen
P. A. Brown and William C. Gruben
Recent economic literature concludes that an invention-importing
country, where domestic invention is scarce or nonexistent, may reduce its welfare and, in some cases,
world welfare, by protecting intellectual property developed elsewhere. The authors use economic theory
to show that such a conclusion may not be fully warranted for products such as antibiotics and pesti-
cides, whose effectiveness diminishes with cumulative use.
Is the Business Cycle of Argentina “Different”? by Finn E. Kydland and Carlos E. J. M. Zarazaga
The authors present business-cycle facts for Argentina, following as closely as possible the empirical
methodology and statistics other studies have used to characterize U.S. and European business cycles.
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